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at the hands of the parent'". Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn.
77, 84, 145 A. 753, 755 (1929), as quoted in the principal case at
243.
TFhe policy, as above stated, is clearly for the benefit of society,
yet it is denied application in this instance, not on the basis of merit,
but rather upon a technical distinction of legal relationships. It is
difficult to visualize a valid reason for such a distinction. If the
rational foundation of the rule is at all sound, it must be equally
sound when applied to circumstances involving a stepparent stand-
ing in loco parentis. The undesirable conditions sought to be pre-
vented by the application of this rule are present indeed in the
situation presented by the principal case.
W. E. M.
EMINENT Do _n-CoNsTrrTruONAL TAxING-REcovERY AGAINST
MNxucn'AL AIRPORT BY ADJACENT PROPERTY OwNERs.-Action by
owners of vacant and unoccupied land adjoining a municipally
owned airport to recover the diminution in value of their land
caused by the fact that airplanes passed over the land at low
altitudes while taking off and landing. Claims were stated in tres-
pass and nuisance but the essence of the action was based primarily
on the theory that the flights constituted an unconstitutional taking
of property. Held, that the alleged continuing and frequent low
flights over the land amount to a taking of an air easement for the
purpose of flying airplanes over the land. The municipality had the
power to acquire an approach way by condemnation but failed to
exercise that power with the result that the continuing flights con-
stituted an unconstitutional taking by the municipality. Ackerman
v. Port of Seattle, 348 P.2d 664 (Wash. 1960).
The fundamental problem presented in this case was one of
first impression in Washington, extending and settling areas of dis-
pute raised in a previous case. Anderson v. Port of Seattle, 49 Wash.
2d 52,8, 304 P.2d 705 (1956). For a report of the principal case on
the first hearing, see Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 829 P.2d 210
(Wash. 1958).
Two conflicting fundamental principles are involved in the
instant case, one being the ownership of private property and the
right to the free use and enjoyment thereof, the other being the
authority of the government to regulate the use and utlization of
private property for the promotion of the public welfare. The
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problem is further complicated by the established doctrine exempt-
ing governmental units from being subjected as defendants to ordi-
nary actions in the courts. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196
(1882). Perhaps in no other area of law are cases so often lost
because of the failure of practitioners presenting them to see the
theory of liability upon which a successful suit could be based.
A study of cases wherein property owners have sought recovery
against operators of airports for the operation of planes over land
adjacent thereto discloses that relief has been sought by the ag-
grieved property owners upon the theories of trespass, nuisance, and
constitutional taking. United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946);
Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385
(1930); Hyde v. Somerset Air Service, 1 N.J. Super 846, 61 A.2d
645 (1948). The Smith case, supra, perhaps the earliest adjudica-
tion concerning the relative rights of the aviator and the landowner,
recognized* an invasion at low altitudes of unoccupied airspace as
constituting a technical trespass. Apparently the common law
doctrine, (as expressed in the phrase, cuius est solum ejus est usque
ad coelum) that ownership of the land extends to the periphery of
the universe, was followed. The common law maxim, a product
of the pre air-traffic age was developed in cases involving overhang-
ing eaves and other physical trespasses, as illustrated by the case
of Hannabalson v. Sessions. 116 Iowa 457, 90 N.W. 93 (1902), where
the plaintiff in a dispute with his neighbor extended his arm over
a common fence. This was held to be a trespass entitling the
defendant "gently and without unreasonable force" to remove the
offending arm.
However, vital the ad coelum doctrine was in our law, it was
tersely rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
Causby case, supra, the court holding that the doctrine has no
place in the modern world, that the air is a public highway within
limits, and that recognition of private claims to the airspace would
seriously interfere with the public interest and transfer into private
ownership that to which only the public has a just claim. Thus the
modem rationale is that there exists a public right of aviation over
the lands of all owners and such aviation cannot be said to be a
trespass without taking into consideration the question of altitude.
In determining whether the landowners' use and enjoyment
of the surface have been subjected to unreasonable interference,
it is apparent that the theory of nuisance as a basis of relief is
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equally available with trespass in cases involving invasion of the
surface area. In Hyde v. Somerset Air Service, supra, in a suit for
an injunction to restrain the operator of an airport from operating
airplaines over complainants' land, it was held that the flights of
the planes unreasonably and unjustifiably impaired the use and
occupation of the land, entitling the complainants to injunctive
cases involving flights over land, the law of private nuisance is a
law oE degree, hence projecting in each case the factual question
whether there is an appreciable and substantial injury causing
material discomfort and annoyance.
While the cases thus discussed illustrate that the uniqueness
of the relationship of modem air transportation to property rights
of land owners has been recognized, the decisions of the courts
have not clearly established the relative rights of the two interests.
However, it has been established that the landowner in the present
day owns at least as much of the superadjacent airspace as he
can occupy and utilize in connection with his land. United States
v. Causby, supra; Delta Air Corp. v. Dersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20
S.E.2d 245 (1942); Hyde v. Somerset Air Service, supra; Yoffee v.
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 385 Pa. 520, 123 A.2d 636 (1956);
Gardner v. County of Allegheny, 382 Pa. 520, 114 A.2d 491 (1955).
Recognizing that the landowner owns some interest in the airspace
the theory of recovery used in the principal case illustrates the
proposition that, within some zone or airspace, repeated invasions
by planes may constitute a taking of property; the rationale of such
a theory being that over a period of time the airplane operator
could acquire a prescriptive right to repeated flights.
The concept of constitutional taking in order to protect the
landowner who complained of intrusions in the air above him
apparently originated in a case where guns had been fired over
land. Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922). The
theory was also alluded to in at least two cases involving intrusions
by airplanes. Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, supra; Thrasher v. City
of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934). In neither of the
latter two cases was there any holding to the effect that recovery
might be had on a constitutional basis as recovery was sought on
other grounds. In any event, the authority for allowing recovery
on a constitutional basis was established in the Causby case, supra,
the court holding that the continued use of airplanes over the prop-
erty constituted a taking of the property by the United States.
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A major point of controversy in the principal case was pre-
sented in deciding the relative possibility of recovery in situations
where the landowner is not actually using the airspace. As pre-
viously indicated, some courts hold that the landowner has property
rights in as much airspace as he is able to occupy or use in the
enjoyment of his land regardless of whether the land is actually
being used. Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, supra; Smith v. New
England Aircraft Co., supra. Other courts have contended that
the landowner has a property interest only in the airspace he
actually utilizes. Brandes v. Mitterling, 67 Ariz. 349, 196 P.2d 464
(1948); Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, supra. Thus, it is clear that
before a decision can be reached on whether a taking has occurred,
an initial question to be resolved is whether a landowner has any
property interest in the superadjacent airspace. The relative merits
of the two views are parallel to the basic concepts of private owner-
ship and enjoyment of property and the public interest in the
development of modem air transportation and have presented a
real difficulty to the courts when called upon to resolve issues
involving these diverse and competing interests.
The question which next arises is whether these property rights
were taken under the eminent domain power so that the owner of
the land has a constitutional right to just compensation. It is no
doubt true that private convenience must often yield to public
convenience but private comfort, health, and safety are still precious
in the eyes of the law, and it is equally true that private property
cannot be taken or damaged for public use without just compen-
sation. Hardy v. Simpson, 118 W. Va. 440, 190 S.E. 680 (1937);
Reilley v. Curley, 75 N.J. Eq. 57, 71 Ati. 700 (1908); Hennessey v.
Carmony, 50 N.J. Eq. 616, 25 Atl. 374 (1892). As to the require-
ment of compensation, the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Con-
stitution requires the payment of compensation only when private
property is taken for public use but many of the state constitutions,
including that of West Virginia, require compensation when private
property is taken or damaged for public use. "Private property shall
not be taken or damaged for public use, without just compensation;
... ." W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 9. Without further analysis it
appears that the provisions of the state constitutions of the type
mentioned afford a broader protection to landowners than does the
Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
In deciding that property rights were taken under the eminent
domain power of the state, the court in the principal case based
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its decision on the presupposition that the municipality, having
power to condemn property so as to provide an adequate approach-
way, failed to do so with the consequent result that the landowners
property was being used and appropriated as an approachway
without just compensation having been paid therefor. The court
concluded that not only was an unconstitutional taking alleged but
also a taking by the municipality, although the municipality itself
operated no airplanes.
The principal case, in holding that the continuing flights over
vacant land amounted to a taking of an air easement, fortified the
rights of property owners even though each case will pose the
enigmatic query as to the extent of a property owners' interest in
the superadjacent airspace. If the findings show a protected in-
terest, the airport owners, as well as the airplane owners, may be
held liable for the diminution in real estate values which occur in
the vicinity of airports. The opinion of the Washington court repre-
sents a highly skillful solution, adjusting the rights of two diverse
interests, wherein the right to the use and enjoyment of private
property was preserved while at the same time the promotion of
the public interest in the development of modem air transportation
was achieved, by recognizing the right of the government to take
private property but subject to the due process requirements of
the constitution.
H. S. S., Jr.
EViDEN E-PERSONAL INJURY CAsEs-BLAcKB o aD SUMMATION.-
P's counsel, in an action for injuries, employed the use of a black-
board during his summation, upon which he placed an itemized
list of figures, some of which were supported by evidence and
others derived from his own calculations. Held, reversing and
remanding for a new trial concerning the quantum of damages, a
blackboard may be used in summation arguments to place thereon
figures supported by evidence, but placing amounts thereon rep-
resenting pain, suffering, and mental anguish involved speculation
on the part of counsel and was putting before the jury matters not
in evidence. Certified T.V. & Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 109
S.E.2d 126 (Va. 1959).
Two pertinent problems in this case merit discussion in rela-
tion to each other. One involves the discussion of pain and suffer-
ing in monetary terms before the jury and the other is the use of a
blackboard in counsel's closing argument.
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